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Reviews
Perspectives

Civil Society in Uncivil
Places: Soft State and
Regime Change in Nepal
By Saubhagya Shah
Washington, D.C.: East-West Center (Policy Studies 48).
2008. ISBN: 9781932728774

Reviewed by Jagannath Adhikari
This monograph discusses the role of civil society in the
Jana Andolan in April 2006 in Nepal, the popular movement
that abolished Nepal’s Hindu monarchy. Shah argues that a
major reason for the visibility and effectiveness of civil society during this political movement was the material and
moral support from external agencies, mainly development
partners. These agencies, Shah argues, had a vested interest
in regime change, especially in making Nepal a secular state.
The author also attempts to distinguish “civil society” in Nepal from western conceptions of civil society.
The author defines all forms of media, NGOs, groups or
associations and their federations or networks as “civil society.” He clumps together all these agencies as civil society and
then attributes the overthrow of the monarchy to all of them
collectively. But the ground experience I have observed is that
although most of these agencies, or civil societies, protested
against the monarchy, only a few played a significant role in
bringing the political parties, Maoists, and external agencies
together. Of them, the media, Nagarik Samaj and Nagarik Andolan were especially prominent. At the time, seven prominent political parties had formed an alliance, called the SPA
(for Seven Party Alliance). Even before the SPA and Maoists
came together through a “12 point agreement” in New Delhi
under the mediation of Indian politicians, the SPA had been
organizing protests in Kathmandu. The media supported this
protest. When SPA and Maoists protested against the King
jointly, the media also played a significant role, so much so
that many people considered the media the eighth party.
Nagarik Samaj and Nagarik Andolan, the two most prominent
civil society organizations, were formed after King Gyanendra
seized political power. These organizations were able to motivate people to revolt against the King at a time when political
parties had also lost popularity because of their dismal performance in the past. Other agencies increased their protests
as the momentum for change heightened. Grassroots organizations such as women’s groups, forest users groups, trade

unions and farmers’ associations all mobilized to protest. The
author argues that the networking of these civil society organizations was responsible for increasing their participation.
Shah places this observation within a much larger argument about the origins of civil society in developing countries. After a brief and clear discussion regarding the origin of
civil society and its changing forms in the west, Shah argues
that civil society in developing countries like Nepal is usually
the imposition of a western idea developed in a very different historical, political and social context. He distinguishes
between “civil society” and “political society.” In the context
of Nepal, he points out, this distinction is blurred. Here, civil
society groups have emerged as multifunctional forms that
incorporate flexible portfolios of development, welfare services, advocacy, and political activism under the influence of
‘the global North’, or ‘developed countries’, on which these
groups are dependent for funds and ideas.
In my view, although one cannot deny the dependency
of NGOs or civil society on external donors and the latter’s
influence in terms of funding and ideas, it would be an exaggeration to claim that political change in Nepal was possible
only through the action of externally-funded civil society.
The author claims that civil society flourished in Nepal after
1990 because donors believed that civil society was needed
for development and thus provided ample funding. But civil
society in Nepal also developed and expanded in the 1990s
because it was restricted during the Panchayat political period
from1960 to 1990. During that period, only those supporting the regime were allowed to work. The establishment of
democracy in 1990 made it easier to form an NGO and other
forms of association. This political change also gave more
rights to people and users of resources to organize their communities and manage local resources for their own benefit.
For instance, all community forest users groups were formed
because of a change in the government regulations, especially
the Forestry Act of 1993. Nepal’s own forest bureaucracy was
instrumental in bringing this Act because it had learned from
three decades of experience that only the people can protect
forests. Later on, user groups developed their networking
through federations, which was also a local innovation. These
groups were instrumental in the protests in 2006, mainly at
the district level. But, of course, they also received some external funds.
In contrast to the author’s argument that civil society in
Nepal grew from outside efforts, I believe that civil society
in Nepal has followed the same trajectory as in the west.
Historically, civil institutions developed in response to local
needs and they operated largely at community levels. Later
on, civil society became a part of political society in Nepal,
especially during the Panchayat period. During this time,
the State helped to promote certain organizations in order to
strengthen nationalism and to disseminate the ideology of the
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political system. But only those few civil society organizations
that supported the system were allowed to operate. This point
has been ignored in the book. The third stage of civil society, which seems to have occurred after 1990, can be termed
“anti-authoritarian,” as civil society organizations, particularly
NGOs, were geared towards building democratic institutions,
respecting human rights, and promoting grassroots alternative development and transparency. The involvement of civil
society organizations in these areas could be because of their
self-interest also. They could work freely in a democratic political system. Moreover, they knew that this system enabled
them to improve their condition. Therefore, they worked
against authoritarian rule. Their activities certainly reached a
climax during King Gyanendra’s direct rule.
The author is right that civil society organizations, mainly
NGOs, were in touch with Maoists during the armed conflict.
But this was more so for continuing development work than
for supporting Maoist political ideology. A few NGOs at the
national level had good relations with Maoists. Most NGOs at
the district level continued their work, negotiating with the
conditions imposed by the Maoists.
The author’s implicit argument that the funding by external donors of civil society weakened the State is also largely
unfounded. Civil society, as a whole, still receives only a fraction (13 %) of external funds that comes to Nepal. The State
has far more control of external funding. Therefore, the role
of external funding in catapulting civil society to prominence
seems largely overstated by the author. Moreover, the relative economic independence of people because of the gradual
breakdown of feudal relations—thanks to globalization and
increased mobility and remittances— was also a force for
their political activism through various associations.
I am also not satisfied with other claims of the author,
namely that after the regime change the activism of civil society declined (p 43); that there was no reduction in political
killings and violence after the regime change (p 43); and that
external interests wanted to make Nepal secular (p 46). It is
a fact that political killings declined after the regime change.
Political killing was at its height during the King’s rule from
2004 to 2005. On average 6 people were killed every day. After the regime change, the political killing declined drastically,
despite some growth of armed organizations in the Tarai. The
activities of civil society, particularly NGOs, have increased,
and even their funding base has grown. But the media has
not given much coverage to the activism of civil society in
the post Jana Andolan period. During the Jana Andolan period, the media adopted a single mission— restoring democracy— because it knew that it flourished only in this political
environment. Similarly, the declaration of Nepal as a secular
state was more in response to the pressure from indigenous
groups. Maoists wanted to have secularism because they had
promised non-Hindu groups, especially the Janajatis, that
they would remove Hinduism as the national religion and
make the country secular. Moreover, a Hindu State would be
against the Maoists principle of “class struggle.” Other parties

76

HIMALAYA XXIX (1-2) 2009

in the SPA also opposed a Hindu State, even though they were
not so vocal in this respect as the Maoists. In fact, in 1960 the
Nepali Congress had promulgated a constitution declaring
Nepal to be a secular state.
Despite these criticisms, Civil Society in Uncivil Places
provides an understanding of how civil society can be an important actor in political change. The only weakness of the
book is that it seems to exaggerate the role of civil society in
regime change in Nepal and the role of external funding in
their activity.
Jagannath Adhikari researches environment and development issues. His most recent book is Food Crisis in Karnali:
A Historical and Politico-economic Perspective. His email is
jagannath.adhikari@gmail.com.

The Sari Soldiers
Directed by Julie Bridgham,
Produced by Julie Bridgham and
Ramyata Limbu
New York: Women Make Movies, DVD, 92 minutes, 2008.

Reviewed by Rama Lohani Chase
The Sari Soldiers is a documentary shot live during the
last few years of Nepal’s armed conflict, called the People’s
War, which lasted for more than a decade (1996-2006). It
captures the multiple dynamics of the civil war in Nepal,
which claimed more than thirteen thousand lives and caused
hundreds of disappearances, placing Nepal near the top of
the list of countries with human rights violations. Initially, I
wondered whether this documentary’s title was another exotic play on words that further victimizes third world women
as metaphors in a cross-cultural transaction. However, the
oxymoronic juxtaposition of “sari” and “soldiers” is apt if understood in the context of a heavily patriarchal society where
women are seldom expected to lead, show courage, or fight
as soldiers are expected to do. The term “sari soldiers” could
even help to redefine the gendered connotation of what bravery, courage, and leadership mean or the type of gender that
can embody these qualities. In other words, we ought not to
understand the role of soldier only on the battlefield.
Six courageous women are the key protagonists in the
film. Militants and soldiers of peace, justice, human rights
and democracy appear in the forms of Devi, Mandira and
Ramkumari. With persistence and resilience, Devi Sunuwar,
a poor dalit woman, seeks justice for her minor daughter
Maina, who was accused of being a Maoist, and abducted and

